Rob Lee (Twitter)
Thread: I completely disagree with this article's conclusions, and I think it stems from a misinterpretation of the data. Tanks, fighters, and ships are not "being pushed into obsolescence" and we are mostly seeing incremental changes in warfare.
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/05/ukraine-russia-putin-war/638423/
Thread: I completely disagree with this article's conclusions, and I think it stems from a misinterpretation of the data. Tanks, fighters, and ships are not "being pushed into obsolescence" and we are mostly seeing incremental changes in warfare.
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/05/ukraine-russia-putin-war/638423/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
If you are going to make a bold claim like "we are seeing the very nature of combat change" you need extraordinary evidence, which this article lacks. Instead, the successes and failures of the Russian and Ukrainian militaries can be explained by well-known principles of war. 2/
If you are going to make a bold claim like "we are seeing the very nature of combat change" you need extraordinary evidence, which this article lacks. Instead, the successes and failures of the Russian and Ukrainian militaries can be explained by well-known principles of war. 2/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
In Ukraine most casualties are coming from unguided artillery, Soviet-era air defenses are countering modernized Soviet-era aircraft, infantry are fighting infantry in trenches with rifles and grenades, tanks are being destroyed by AT mines, and most equipment is decades old. 3/
In Ukraine most casualties are coming from unguided artillery, Soviet-era air defenses are countering modernized Soviet-era aircraft, infantry are fighting infantry in trenches with rifles and grenades, tanks are being destroyed by AT mines, and most equipment is decades old. 3/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
UCAVs and loitering munitions are playing a role, but they're not decisive and they aren't replacing manned aircraft or artillery. COTS UAVs are significant, but they are mostly being used to facilitate artillery, ISR for advancing units, and supporting existing capabilities. 4/
UCAVs and loitering munitions are playing a role, but they're not decisive and they aren't replacing manned aircraft or artillery. COTS UAVs are significant, but they are mostly being used to facilitate artillery, ISR for advancing units, and supporting existing capabilities. 4/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Russia has lost a lot of tanks in Ukraine but this is mostly a result of poor strategy and employment, not a deficiency of tanks themselves. We haven't learned much new about tanks from this war, except the well-know lesson that tanks are vulnerable without combined arms. 5/
Russia has lost a lot of tanks in Ukraine but this is mostly a result of poor strategy and employment, not a deficiency of tanks themselves. We haven't learned much new about tanks from this war, except the well-know lesson that tanks are vulnerable without combined arms. 5/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Re: Oryx's figures, of the 741 recorded Russian tank losses, 306 (41%) were found abandoned by their crews. Many of the destroyed tanks on the list were also abandoned and destroyed by UA forces who could not capture them. >50% of Russia's tank losses may have been abandoned. 6/
Re: Oryx's figures, of the 741 recorded Russian tank losses, 306 (41%) were found abandoned by their crews. Many of the destroyed tanks on the list were also abandoned and destroyed by UA forces who could not capture them. >50% of Russia's tank losses may have been abandoned. 6/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Those data do not indicate that tanks are obsolete, they indicate that tank units were poorly employed. Russia's invasion plan presumed little resistance, and its forces were not well-prepared to deal with resistance. Ground units focused on moving long distances too quickly. 7/
Those data do not indicate that tanks are obsolete, they indicate that tank units were poorly employed. Russia's invasion plan presumed little resistance, and its forces were not well-prepared to deal with resistance. Ground units focused on moving long distances too quickly. 7/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
They did so by moving without proper support, such as artillery, EW, logistics, ISR, etc. and often did not move as cohesive BTGs. These units became rapidly overextended and were poorly positioned to handle resistance from the Ukrainian military or guerrilla tactics. 8/
They did so by moving without proper support, such as artillery, EW, logistics, ISR, etc. and often did not move as cohesive BTGs. These units became rapidly overextended and were poorly positioned to handle resistance from the Ukrainian military or guerrilla tactics. 8/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
The initial phase of Russia's invasion was not combined arms. The Air Force and Ground Forces fought separate campaigns and aviation didn't really support the ground advance. This left ground forces vulnerable. We should not try to draw sweeping lessons about warfare from this.9/
The initial phase of Russia's invasion was not combined arms. The Air Force and Ground Forces fought separate campaigns and aviation didn't really support the ground advance. This left ground forces vulnerable. We should not try to draw sweeping lessons about warfare from this.9/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Tanks are vulnerable without combined arms support. This has been known for 100 years. Russia did not have enough infantry in this invasion and Russian tank regiments changed their T/O by reducing their motorized rifle battalions to a 75-man company. This was insufficient. 10/
Tanks are vulnerable without combined arms support. This has been known for 100 years. Russia did not have enough infantry in this invasion and Russian tank regiments changed their T/O by reducing their motorized rifle battalions to a 75-man company. This was insufficient. 10/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
How do you protect tanks from modern ATGM teams? You push UAVs and ground reconnaissance ahead of tank units and deploy sufficient infantry to protect tanks, particularly in urban areas. Russia didn't do this in the beginning, and tank units suffered as a result. 11/
How do you protect tanks from modern ATGM teams? You push UAVs and ground reconnaissance ahead of tank units and deploy sufficient infantry to protect tanks, particularly in urban areas. Russia didn't do this in the beginning, and tank units suffered as a result. 11/
Necro Mancer (Twitter)
Очень грустная история о том, как ефрейтор Шкет Александр Владимирович 1989 г.р. из села Плоское Курганской обл. съездил туда и обратно https://vk.com/wall-213644587_2 #всрф #потерьнет #груз200
Очень грустная история о том, как ефрейтор Шкет Александр Владимирович 1989 г.р. из села Плоское Курганской обл. съездил туда и обратно https://vk.com/wall-213644587_2 #всрф #потерьнет #груз200
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Rob Lee (Twitter)
VDV, motorized rifle, and spetsnaz units suffered similar problems at the beginning of the war. They made rapid dashes without combined arms support and sustained heavy casualties in many areas, including Hostomel, Bucha, Irpin, Sumy, Kharkiv, etc. 12/
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@RALee85:
Video take by Ukrainian soldiers riggt after seizing the Russian Tigr-M vehicles in Kharkiv.
https://t.co/3CmWht4pkI https://t.co/4TYtgENb2u
VDV, motorized rifle, and spetsnaz units suffered similar problems at the beginning of the war. They made rapid dashes without combined arms support and sustained heavy casualties in many areas, including Hostomel, Bucha, Irpin, Sumy, Kharkiv, etc. 12/
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@RALee85:
Video take by Ukrainian soldiers riggt after seizing the Russian Tigr-M vehicles in Kharkiv.
https://t.co/3CmWht4pkI https://t.co/4TYtgENb2u