Информационных обменов России со штаб-квартирой НАТО давно нет, при этом Москва была готова к переговорам с альянсом, но НАТО игнорирует российскую сторону, сообщил глава МИД РФ Сергей Лавров.
«В принципе каких-то даже информационных обменов со штаб-квартирой североатлантического альянса давно уже нет», - сказал Лавров журналистам,...
https://interaffairs.ru/news/show/32169

🇷🇺 Отказ НАТО от равноправного диалога и совместной работы по вопросам деэскалации напряжённости в Европе привели к приостановке деятельности российской миссии при альянсе, заявил во вторник глава российской делегации на переговорах в Вене по вопросам военной безопасности и контроля над вооружениями Константин Гаврилов.

🗣 «Со своей стороны продолжаем работу по созданию условий для стабилизации обстановки на глобальном и региональном уровнях, а также поступательное и сбалансированное развитие армии и флота для обеспечения мирного социально-экономического развития страны без втягивания в затратную гонку вооружений».

🔗Подробнее в материале РИА-Новости: https://ria.ru/20211019/dialog-1755270236.html

🎙 Руководитель Делегации К.Ю.#Гаврилов выступил на 8-м экспертном семинаре-практикуме в рамках "Структурированного диалога" о нынешних и будущих рисках и вызовах безопасности в регионе #ОБСЕ.

🚨 Отслеживаем провокационные попытки задействования против нашей страны экономических санкций, силового и идеологического давления. Мощный натиск идёт на систему традиционных ценностей. Имеет место скоординированное использование многочисленных псевдоправозащитных структур.

🔹 Противодействие этой «политической пехоте» на постоянной основе требует совершенствования наших программных документов. Ведь сегодня вряд ли кто-то способен объяснить, каким образом с подрывными акциями и «цветными революциями», управляемыми и финансируемыми извне, можно бороться, традиционными, веками испытанными способами.

❗ "Важнейшим постулатом обеспечения военной безопасности нашего государства является гарантированное сдерживание любого потенциального противника, в том числе коалиционного состава, от развязывания военной агрессии против России и её союзников".

📎 https://bit.ly/3psnsta

🗓 20 октября 2021 года на спецзаседании ФСОБ ОБСЕ 🇷🇺 Делегация выступила против переиздания Венского документа 2011 года о мерах укрепления доверия и безопасности.

❗ Руководитель Делегации К.Ю.#Гаврилов: Судьба Венского документа неотделима от общей ситуации в сфере европейской безопасности. Перспективы его обновления мы можем рассматривать лишь в контексте отказа Североатлантического альянса от политики «сдерживания» России.

📎Подробнее: https://bit.ly/3npkiUb

7️⃣6️⃣ лет назад, вступил в силу Устав Организации Объединённых Наций, подписанный 26 июня 1945 года в Сан-Франциско на заключительном заседании Конференции Объединенных Наций. В этот день, 24 октября 1945 года, он был ратифицирован пятью постоянными членами Совета Безопасности ООН и большинством других подписавших его государств. Эта дата считается днем рождения ООН.

📄Принятие Устава обозначило начало новой эры в истории человечества.

🇷🇺❤️🇺🇳 Россия последовательно выступает за укрепление центральной и координирующей роли ООН в мировых делах.

💬С.В.Лавров: «Для России очевидно, что эффективно противостоять вызовам и угрозам можно лишь солидарными усилиями в строгом соответствии с общепризнанными нормами международного права, прежде всего – целями и принципами Устава ООН».

🎉 С Днём рождения, ООН!

#НашиПравилаУставООН
#UNCharterIsOurRules
#CharteONUEstNosLois
#CartaONUesNstrReglas
‎#ميثاق_الأمم_المتحدة_هو_قواعدنا
#联合国宪章是我们的主张

🇷🇺Российская Федерация выступает против расширительных трактовок Кодекса поведения ОБСЕ, касающегося военно-политических аспектов безопасности. В последнее время фиксируем недопустимые попытки внедрить в контекст его обсуждения вопросы «гендерного» равноправия в самом широком смысле слова.

📎Подробнее в выступлении руководителя Делегации К.Ю.Гаврилова: https://bit.ly/3CbI2BC

🎙 25 октября руководитель Делегации К.Ю.#Гаврилов дал интервью телеканалу Россия-24 в связи с сообщениями о планируемых поставках 🇬🇧 британских вооружений на 🇺🇦 Украину и провокационными антироссийскими заявлениями из Киева.

📎Подробнее: https://youtu.be/wAtqOptf1u0

#Украина #вооружения #ракеты #Европа

НАТО ведет опасные игры, заявляя о желании распространить свою миссию на весь мир, Россия будет делать все для противостояния таким тенденциям. Об этом заявил в среду на пресс-конференции министр иностранных дел РФ Сергей Лавров.
«Есть свидетельства того, что натовские планировщики сейчас обращают внимание на Восток, уже говорят устами генсека НАТО...
https://interaffairs.ru/news/show/32253

⚡ Deputy Director of the Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Anton Mazur addressed the FSC meeting as a keynote speaker

📌 Full script of the statement in English
Agenda item: Security Dialogue
Subject: The future of conventional arms control

29 September 2021

💬 Mr. Chairperson,

👏 I am sincerely grateful to you for the invitation to participate in this meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation and to return, albeit remotely, to a room that has witnessed so many memorable events. I am pleased to welcome my esteemed colleagues and fellow keynote speakers, especially Ambassador Susanne Baumann and Colonel Wolfgang Richter, with whom I have been working together for many years.

Mr. Chairperson,

🔹 Today’s meeting is devoted to the future of arms control. But there is no future without a past, without those who have worked selflessly to make this future happen.

🙏 On that note, I should like to pay tribute to my colleague and oldest friend, Ambassador Vladislav Chernov, who passed away a month and a half ago. Those who worked at the Hofburg from 1989 to 2015 will of course remember him. Vladislav was one of the pioneers of European arms control and gave much strength and energy to this cause. He headed the Russian delegation from to 2000 to 2006. He was an extremely radiant person, who combined wisdom, diplomatic talent, an analytical mind, diverse creative abilities and the very best human qualities – kindness and integrity, a serious attitude to the business at hand and a refined sense of humour. Vladislav was respected and loved not only by his friends and associates, but also by many of those who sat on the other side of the table. Blessed be his memory.

Mr. Chairperson,

🔹 Arms control is part of a much broader relationship among States in the field of security. As a process, it develops in fits and starts, depending on the political situation in the world as a whole and in individual regions.

The best results so far have been achieved in the stages of transition from violent confrontation to détente. Moreover, these stages have usually been associated with the formation of a new balance of power (for example, with the achievement of strategic parity in military terms, with the USSR’s success in developing anti-missile defence systems or with a profound transformation or dissolution of a politico-military alliance). Conversely, an increasing military threat, as was the case in the early 1930s, has made it impossible to reach even limited agreements.

🔸 The Framework for Arms Control of 1996 was one of the last vestiges of the fairly short “golden age of disarmament”, when there was still some hope of “developing the OSCE area as an indivisible common security space” and of making the principle of the indivisibility of security itself a reality. This is the reason for its historical optimism (incidentally, something similar can also be found in the 1994 Code of Conduct, Section V of which actually envisaged the creation of collective security mechanisms within the OSCE).

🔹 However, these hopes have not been realized. At first, the West preferred to ensure its security through a bloc, preserving the dividing lines and moving them eastwards under the pretext of the “inadmissibility of a security vacuum”. A little later, those in Washington, D.C., as part of the concept of “American leadership”, considered that the arms control objectives had been achieved, the former Cold War adversaries disarmed, and further movement along this path could be terminated.

Hence, the refusal to ratify the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), the long-standing unwillingness (for more than ten years) to modernize the Vienna Document, the undermining of the negotiations on Article V of Annex 1-B of the Dayton Agreement and other consequences that have had a detrimental effect on arms control and confidence-building agreements in the military sphere.

🔸 In the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, Russia repeatedly advocated a major overhaul of the regime of conventional arms control in Europe and its alignment with the politico-military realities on the continent; it was the first to call for a profound updating of the European security acquis, having proposed that a European Security Treaty be concluded. Unfortunately, none of these proposals have received a constructive response.

😢 The deplorable state of conventional arms control in recent years is just one manifestation of the deep systemic crisis facing “hard” security in Europe. As noted in the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation approved in July of this year, the rise of geopolitical instability and conflict and the strengthening of inter-State disagreements are accompanied by a growing threat of the use of military force.

The undermining of universally recognized norms and principles of international law, the weakening and destruction of existing international legal institutions, and the ongoing dismantling of the system of arms control treaties and agreements lead to increasing tensions and exacerbation of the politico-military situation, in particular near the State border of the Russian Federation. A number of States call Russia a threat and even a military adversary. There is a growing risk of armed conflicts escalating into local and regional wars, including those involving nuclear powers.

💪 Military dangers and military threats to the Russian Federation are intensified by attempts to exert pressure through military force on Russia, its allies and partners, the build-up of NATO military infrastructure near Russian borders, increased reconnaissance activities, and drills in using large military formations and nuclear weapons against the Russian Federation.

🌍 The desire to isolate the Russian Federation and the use of double standards in international politics are preventing multilateral co-operation from becoming more effective in such important areas for the international community as ensuring equal and indivisible security for all States, in particular in Europe. Such assessments of the current situation are contained in the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation.

🙁 Unfortunately, the commitment made by our Western partners back in 2014 to “maintaining, strengthening and modernizing conventional arms control in Europe” has not been backed up by any practical steps. So far we have seen only progressive implementation of NATO summit decisions with a clear anti-Russian orientation.

🔹 The members of the Alliance might want to ask themselves how their proposed modernization of the Vienna Document or the possibility of new agreements on conventional arms control in Europe square with their actions in the military sphere and with the groundless accusations (of the “highly likely” style) against Russia. If you want to invite your partner to a dialogue, you should not start the invitation by rebuking it.

🔸 As for the concerns of our Western colleagues about Russia’s alleged build-up of its military capability and the “provoking of tensions on the borders with NATO”, it was not Russia that moved closer to the line of contact with the Alliance, but rather NATO itself, as it expanded, moved very near to our borders under the pretext of needing to “fill the security vacuum” in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and also in the Baltics.

It will hardly be possible to create a new architecture of conventional arms control in Europe given the acute lack of trust in Europe and the comprehensive “containment” of our country embodied in NATO’s policy and military planning.

🔹 Past experience shows that initiatives in the field of conventional arms control in Europe can be successfully implemented solely in the context of a unifying political project. There is a need for a common political vision of the new model of relations, of the future of European security as a whole and of the further development of its key elements.

Broadly speaking, the development of a new regime of conventional arms control in Europe can only be part of the move towards a system of common and indivisible security in Europe. The main point of arms control is greater security with fewer resources.

🔸 The realization that the resumption of relevant dialogue was clearly overdue against the backdrop of the erosion, degradation and devaluation of European conventional arms control regimes and instruments and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) led to the launch of the Structured Dialogue at the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in Hamburg in 2016. Unfortunately, however, the goal set for that platform at the time – to “work towards creating an environment conducive to reinvigorating conventional arms control and CSBMs in Europe” – is still a long way off.

👌 Creating a favourable climate for the dialogue would undoubtedly be conducive to its success. By this we understand abandoning the policy of “containment” of Russia by force, recognizing and respecting Russian interests, restoring normal relations with our country, halting the process of strengthening NATO’s military capabilities near Russian borders while at the same time reducing the military activities of the North Atlantic Alliance on the “eastern flank”, continuing the withdrawal of continuously rotating forces and hardware to their permanent locations and returning to the situation that existed before 2014.

Unfortunately, we have not yet seen any willingness on the part of our Western partners to deal seriously with these issues.

🔹 Russia, for its part, is open to the discussion of international security issues on the basis of equal rights and mutual consideration of the interests of all parties. In that connection, I should like to return once again to our new National Security Strategy.

In particular, it states that the Russian Federation seeks to increase predictability in relations between States and strengthen trust and security in the international sphere. So as to reduce the threat of a new global war being unleashed, to avert an arms race and to prevent it from spilling over into new environments, there is a need to improve the mechanisms for maintaining strategic stability, arms control, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and to observe confidence-building measures.

🔸 It is anticipated that these foreign policy objectives can be achieved, inter alia, by improving the mechanisms for ensuring collective security at the global and regional level, arms control, the implementation and development, where necessary, of confidence
-building measures and the prevention of military incidents.

❗ I stress once more that Russia is prepared to work towards creating the necessary conditions for resuming constructive dialogue on a new architecture for a European conventional arms control regime, if and when our partners are ready for this.

❓ What could such a regime look like? It would probably be premature to talk about it in detail today. However, some basic features could be listed. It should reflect the balance of interests of all participating States, preclude the military superiority of any group of States, build confidence and facilitate the de-escalation of tensions in Europe, contribute to the prevention of a subregional arms race, institute a less costly verification mechanism and not be tied up with any conflict-resolution issues.

In a purely personal capacity and drawing on my negotiation experience, I can sketch a few more outlines.

🟣 First, I think it is obvious to many in this room that new agreements (if and when they are reached) will have to be written from scratch, as the approaches laid down in, say, the CFE Treaty of 1990 have long since become hopelessly outdated. This applies, in particular, to the limitations (above all the flank sublevels on the territory of any State), to excessively intrusive information exchange and control regimes.

🟣 Second, a possible future regime could be more flexible (for example, providing for mutual restraint instead of strict limitations) and thus politically rather than legally binding.

🟣 Third, in the 1990s, one of the two opposing politico-military alliances ceased to exist. However, the second one not only survived, but is also expanding and building up its capabilities. We cannot ignore this.

🟣 Fourth, the fact that the territories of two major OSCE participating States remain outside the scope of arms control and confidence-building measures raises a growing number of questions. Their eagerness to modernize the Vienna Document when it applies to others is understandable. But transparency must be mutual.

🟣 Fifth, it is obvious that the significance and “weight” of the various categories of armaments change over time, so the scope of a possible future agreement might need to be re-examined as well.

🟣 Sixth, in discussions on the future of conventional arms control in Europe, there has been talk for many years now about the desirability of taking qualitative parameters into account. This topic has also been mentioned today. This question is justified, but no one can say how exactly this aim could be achieved.

🟣 Seventh, it would appear that once the conditions have been created in the Structured Dialogue and, of course, in a broader political context to enable a return to discussions on the further development of conventional arms control in Europe and CSBMs, the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation could serve as a negotiating platform for the development of such agreements.

However, in order to do so, the participants would have to “come out of the trenches”, adopt a constructive tone and restore, or rather recreate, a negotiating culture. In this respect, by the way, we consider the Structured Dialogue to be a means of maintaining at least some elements of such a culture.

🟣 Eighth, however we may feel about it today, the “golden age of disarmament” was made possible for the most part as a result of perestroika in the USSR. Unfortunately, the approaches of our Western colleagues both then and much later have not undergone a similar transformation – much of it still resembles the archaic Harmel Doctrine today. I think that if our current opponents really want to see a new increase in arms control, they will have to take that path.

Of course, these eight points are just some purely tentative “thinking out aloud”, which may be helpful to some as food for their own thoughts.

❗ Mr. Chairperson,

I haven’t said anything about the gender perspectives of conventional arms control in Europe and CSBMs. And, to be honest, not only because of a lack of time. I just don’t really understand what is meant by it. For me, as a mid-level official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs overseeing this area, it is the competencies and human qualities of my colleagues, and not their gender, that are important. Those staff members who have proved themselves progress more quickly, and I don’t see anything unusual about women (who, incidentally, make up about 30 to 40 per cent of our workforce) progressing more quickly than men. You don’t need to look far to find examples – you see them every week in the Neuer Saal.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

❗ Руководитель Делегации К.Ю.#Гаврилов о планируемых поставках британских ракет на Украину и применении турецкого БПЛА «Байрактар» в Донбассе:

🔹 Публикация газеты «The Times» <…> начинается с «абсурдного» предположения о том, что Россия якобы может попытаться использовать газовый кризис для «захвата украинской территории». Именно на таком «тревожном» фоне, дескать, британцы могут поставить Киеву ракеты класса «земля-земля». Речь идёт о ракетах «Бримстоун» консорциума MDBA, которые впоследствии будут размещаться на кораблях ВМС Украины. Помимо этого, рассматривается возможность их установки на украинских самолётах по стоимости 138 тыс. долл. США за ракету.

🔸 Не будет лишним напомнить, что подобные ракеты использовались британскими королевскими ВВС во время военных операций в Афганистане, Ливии и Сирии.

🔹 Минобороны Великобритании подтвердило эту информацию, сославшись на заключённый 23 июня в Одессе трёхсторонний меморандум британской группы Babcock с оборонным ведомством Украины и правительством Великобритании относительно ввода в действие программы «Расширения возможностей ВМС Украины» (Ukraine’s Naval Capabilities Enhancement Programme). Она будет осуществляться при полном британском содействии.

🔸 Не берусь комментировать пассажи касательно «газового» кризиса в Европе (эти абсолютно параноидальные инсинуации), но напомню, что на протяжении текущего раунда переговоров делегация Великобритании неоднократно озвучивала «обеспокоенности» нашей военной деятельностью на территории России (проводить эти учения на национальной территории – наше суверенное право).

🔹 «Плоды» подобных решений не только не приведут к снижению напряжённости «на земле», но и значительно ухудшат положение мирных жителей Донбасса, буквально живущих «under loaded gun».

🔸 Напоминаем британским коллегам, что в отсутствие оружейного эмбарго Совета Безопасности ООН в отношении поставок вооружений на Украину действует целая система международных ограничений и запретов, включая «Принципы, регулирующие передачи обычных вооружений», Международный договор о торговле оружием (МДТО), п.10 минского «Комплекса мер» о необходимости вывода иностранной военной техники с территории Украины и другие.

🔹 Поэтому есть все основания уверенно квалифицировать поставки вооружений в раздираемую конфликтом страну как проявление правового нигилизма, подрывающего статус и значимость соответствующих международных договорённостей и обязательств. Подобные действия отнюдь не свидетельствуют о приверженности мирному урегулированию конфликта на юго-востоке Украины.

🔸 Не можем не обратить внимание на то, что демонстративно не упоминалось на сегодняшнем заседании Форума ни делегацией Украины, ни «англосаксонским трио» – это использование боевых БПЛА (турецкий «Байрактар») в Донбассе 26 октября. Как отметил С.В.Лавров, произошедшее должно заставить задуматься тех, кто вооружает киевский режим.

🔹 Вызывает возмущение и захват украинскими военными с.Старомарьевка (в том числе и проживающих там граждан России) находящегося в так называемой «серой зоне». Всё это требует немедленной реакции международного сообщества. Это является прямым нарушением Минских договорённостей, усугубляет ситуацию на линии соприкосновения в Донбассе и не способствует урегулированию внутриукраинского конфликта.